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Introduction
Henry Kissinger was at various points in his career a soldier, professor, National Security
Advisor, and Secretary of State. One of the most influential diplomats in United States history.
Perhaps one of its most influential politicians, though ironically he was never elected to any
position in his life. Advisor to presidents and shaper of foreign policy. Even today his legacy is
still of import and the subject of debate between the current presidential candidates. Even though
he has not held government office for many years, he continues to influence United States
foreign policy and domestic politics through his writing and lobbying. But perhaps his influence
on the United States and foreign policy was never greater than in 1973 with the Yom Kippur
War.
The year 1973 sits in the middle of the Cold War. The Vietnam War was just beginning
to wind down and the United States started to normalize relations with the other great
Communist power in Asia, China. However, domestically and especially within the White House
the focus was on the fallout of a breakin at a Washington hotel by the name of Watergate. This
was the backdrop against which Henry Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State of the United
States. And with all that was happening, Kissinger’s responsibilities and power in this position
significantly expanded. The rest of the government, including President Nixon, was focused on
the politics of a scandal. And the only one left to deal with an external opportunity or threat, a
war in the Middle East, was Henry Kissinger.
Between noon and 1:00pm (Israeli time)1 on October 6,1973, on the Jewish high holy day
of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise military offensive along much of Israel’s
1

From this point on, all times will be given based on Eastern Standard time to reflect the hours that Kissinger was
receiving information or making decisions. For events that deal specifically with a location in another timezone, the
timezone referenced will be included as a note.
Page 3

Southern and North Eastern borders.2 As Yom Kippur is one of the most important holidays for
Jews, Israel was caught by surprise, forcing them not only to hastily summon their military
reservists, but also to put out a hasty call to its allies for assistance.3 As Israel’s strongest ally and
benefactor, the United States would be reluctantly drawn into a conflict that it did not want.4 As
such the Yom Kippur War would not only prove to be a pivotal conflict for the nations in the
Middle East. but it would dictate the course of American involvement in the Middle East and the
United States’ relationship with each of the countries in that region over the next half century.
Two questions must be asked of how Henry Kissinger relates to the United States’
reaction to the Yom Kippur War. First, how much influence did he have in directing US foreign
policy during the first days of the Yom Kippur? Second, how did that influence translate to the
direction of American foreign policy during that period of time? To do this, I am returning to a
examine a collection of documents that have been inaccessible to many historians up to present.
These include notes of meetings between Kissinger and other officials and staff, notes and
reports sent between department, and telephone transcripts of every call that Kissinger made or
received. All of these new sources provide a new parallel narrative to Kissinger’s writing that I
can then use to compare to Kissinger’s version of events, and use to reflect on the historiography
of Kissinger and Yom Kippur up to present.

2

October 6, 1973 8:29am (EST) Teleconversation between Minister Shalev (Israel) and Henry Kissinger.
Patrick Tyler, 
A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East From the Cold War to the War on
Terror,
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009), 138
Both Israel and the United States were caught by surprise in this offensive. Though Kissinger had received various
reports that pointed to an attack on October 6, that intelligence was apparently insufficient to provoke any sort of
preparation.
4
Boaz Vanetik and Zaki Shalom, “The White House Middle East Policy in 1973 as a Catalyst for the Outbreak of
the Yom Kippur War,” Israel Studies 16, no. 1 (2011): 66, Project Muse.
3
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From an historian’s perspective, this period is rich with information with which to draw
an extensive picture of this juxtaposition of the war and the United States’ foreign policy
interests. But it is also a veritable minefield due to flawed primary sources. Chief among those
sources is Kissinger himself. Kissinger published numerous volumes of his memoirs. 
Years of
Upheaval, about his time as Secretary of State starting at the beginning of Richard Nixon’s
second presidential term in January 1973, was published in 1982.
Kissinger’s memoirs are puzzling as written history. On one hand they are primary
documents about the events they describe they are reflections from a leading character in those
events and they draw on the government documents that Kissinger would have access to. On the
other hand, a memoir is interpreted history through the lens of the writer. And there is no doubt
that Kissinger had an agenda in how he reflected about his own actions and choices.
However, this memoir continues to be used as the primary source that subsequent
historians use to write about Kissinger and the war. Why? Because the government documents
that serve as Kissinger’s backup sources have been classified for many years and so a path to
these legitimate sources requires using Kissinger’s memoirs as a medium to that information.
Per government guidelines, all of these documents were classified for 3040 years. That
means that up until very recently, historians have been interpreting Yom Kippur without access
to a wealth of essential information. Even though these documents began to be declassified
around 2004,5 for much of the last decade they have been inaccessible to researchers, and even
now are in a very unwieldy format that frustrates any easy reading of them. However, a closer

5

Portions of these collections of documents first became available due to continuous requests through the Freedom
of Information Act. Once a large amount of these documents were declassified, hard copies of them were stored in a
number of places like the Nixon archives. Recently, the Digital National Security Archive based at George
Washington University has been compiling an online database of all Kissinger phone calls and memoranda available
in an online collection.
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reading of these newly released sources allows for a retrospective critique of Kissinger’s account
of Yom Kippur, his role in it, and relative success or failure of the decisions he made.
Through a deeper study of these new sources, a clearer timeline of Kissinger’s response
to the outbreak of the war can be formulated. This new narrative shows that Kissinger did indeed
amass a much greater position of influence as Secretary of State as President Nixon’s was
absorbed in the fallout of Watergate. The United States’ handling of the conflict was directed by
Kissinger in consultation with a handful of members of Nixon’s staff. Kissinger purposely kept
Nixon out of the process of making decisions as he feared that Nixon would not be able to make
balanced decisions. Second, Kissinger had this greater range of power as he directed all US
foreign policy through his office (and not the White House,) However, he did not use it to
promote a radically (or even moderately) new agenda in the Middle East. Instead, he used this
position to try to maintain a balance and a return to the status quo in order to maintain positive
relationships with Israel and Egypt, as well as the Soviet Union.

Historiography
Henry Kissinger continues to prove to be a frustration to interpret. Kissinger's memoirs
have served as the cornerstone texts on United States foreign policy for over the last forty years.
They have also served as some of the most influential texts on the study of Kissinger himself.
Those scholars that choose to use Kissinger's works to inform their own writing must wrestle
with a variety of questions. The first question they face is whether the thoughtful and methodical
reasoning Kissinger offers for various important decisions is to be believed. Is the intentionality
Kissinger describes real or was it a product of hindsight, and the reality was that he was more
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reactionary to the circumstances surrounding him? Another issue with Kissinger's memoirs is the
fact that Kissinger writes himself as the central character. Not only is he the central character, but
he is the leading character. The scope of this study focuses the next question on one very pivotal
period in Kissinger's career: As Secretary of State, did Kissinger essentially run the Executive
Branch and dictate US foreign policy while President Richard Nixon was embroiled in the
Watergate Scandal?
Foreign policy would be the primary arena of Kissinger's influence and interest. How did
Kissinger's philosophies like realpolitik play out in real life circumstances? All these questions
become especially relevant in a study of Kissinger centering around the year 1973 and the Yom
Kippur War. How does one reconcile any challenges to the traditional Kissinger narrative
regarding the United States' role in the conflict? Since Kissinger has so dramatically affected the
narrative of the Yom Kippur War, it is important to both understand to what extent historians
have been influenced by Kissinger in their own work, and the actual role Kissinger played in the
United States' involvement in the Yom Kippur War.
Ultimately, a Kissinger historian should be able to objectively examine both Kissinger's
personality and his policies. But the reality is that most often any conclusion of Kissinger's
foreign policy legacy is colored by a preconception of Kissinger's character and reputation the
two are almost inextricably linked. This focus on Kissinger's personal legacy belongs not only to
the historian. Kissinger himself was, and continues to be, focused on his personal and
professional reputation.
Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year by Alistair Horne is one of the most recent
biographies written about Henry Kissinger. Instead of a comprehensive volume on all or most of
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Kissinger's career 6, Horne carves out and examines a single year of Kissinger's time in power,
1973. He draws upon the whole breadth of writing on Kissinger to examine how the broad
narrative of Kissinger applies to the single year of Kissinger's career. His study also is influenced
by Kissinger’s own writing, his past interviews, and Horne's own personal interactions with
Henry Kissinger. Horne is very focused on Kissinger's personality; how it influenced Kissinger's
leadership style and decision making. Horne certainly emphasizes Kissinger's intentionality;
even those parts of his character that seemed erratic were actually meticulously purposed as a
means to an end.7 This conclusion on the intentionality of Kissinger informs how Horne views
the rest of Kissinger in 1973. Even during the Yom Kippur War this assumption of an unspoken
agenda would be one response to critics who point out various questionable choices made by
Kissinger throughout the conflict.
Now, Horne's work falls quite within the positive end of the spectrum of opinions on
Henry Kissinger. Horne himself freely admits that his personal interactions with Kissinger have
influenced his favourable impression of the man.8 But Horne's work comes in the context of the
preceding scholarly work on the the life and career of Henry Kissinger. Horne cites Walter
Isaacson's Kissinger: A 
Biography as perhaps the first clear foundation upon which all current
study of Kissinger is based upon.9
For Horne, the broad body of study contributed by Isaacson is now being brought current
by Niall Ferguson's multiplevolume work10 on the career of Henry Kissinger. These two works,
Isaacson and Ferguson's, provide inductive studies of Kissinger that look at the breadth of

6

As had been done by Walter Isaacson and will be done again by Niall Ferguson, in three parts.
Alstair Horne, 
Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 30.
8
Horne, xiii
9
Walter Isaacson,
Kissinger: A Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1995).
10
Niall Ferguson,
Kissinger: Volume I: The Idealist, 19231968
, (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 32.
7
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Kissinger's life and work, document each significant moment in that timeline, and attempt to
paint a broad picture of who Kissinger was and is from the small details of each examined
episode. This follows more of a deductive train of study and sets Horne's book apart in the midst
of Kissinger study bookended by Isaacson's and Ferguson's works.
Horne acknowledges Kissinger's focus, in fact obsession, with his reputation. He writes
about his experience interviewing Kissinger, “I sensed him constantly worrying about what I was
going to say... worrying (often unnecessarily) over how I saw his image over specific issues.”11
This would become the defining manner in which Kissinger would interact with those studying
himself. Even his extensive memoirs are an extension of this. They were a preemptive effort to
present his own perspective on events with which he was involved. Kissinger used his own
collection of meticulous records to provide what would seem to be an objective foundation for
13

his analyses of United States foreign affairs under his watch.12 ,
One of the most prevalent themes of Kissinger: 1973: The Crucial Year is Horne's focus
on the insecurities of Kissinger that hid behind the blatant ambition normally portrayed by
Kissinger biographers. For a journalist, this is most important in forming a story, a narrative, of
the character being studied. However, this also is helpful historically in understanding the
dynamics of Kissinger in his relationship to President Richard Nixon, his subordinates, and the
press.14 For Horne, Kissinger's insecurity manifested itself in brutal expections at work with his
subordinates. However, according to Horne, these unbearable high expectations culled out the
wavering amongst his subordinates and served as a refining fire for those that remained that

Horne, 32
.

11

Horne, xiv
.
Henry Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval
, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982).

12
13

Horne, 34
.

14
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would instill respect and loyalty.15 This brutal work environment, at least according to Horne,
had a logic to it and though it was bred out of Kissinger's personality issues, it made for a better
functioning organization.
Beginning in the instance of the work environment Kissinger cultivated, Horne differs
greatly from the Kissinger vignette painted by Isaacson and the like. Walter Isaacsons' Kissinger:
A Biography was one of the first in depth studies of Kissinger's life. It was published at the
pinnacle of Kissinger's career. And though it was published before the remainder of Kissinger's
played out, it is still considered a veritable cornerstone of the study of Kissinger. Even as a
contemporary of Kissinger's, Isaacson distances himself from any personal contact with
Kissinger. He attempts to provide as objective an analysis of Kissinger's policies and their
consequences as he can. His criticisms would be the roots of much larger charges against
Kissinger.1617 This goes to illustrate that even during Kissinger's tenure, there were those that
attempted to distance themselves from Kissinger to find an objective narrative separate from that
given by Kissinger.
Isaacson notes the Kissinger's and Nixon's tempers were both volatile and unpredictable.
Though the outlet for each man would prove different while Nixon would sit alone, brood, and
plot vengeance, Kissinger would violently blow up at the source of any frustration to him (or
erupt at anything in general).18 At least according to Isaacson, there was no rhyme or reason to

15

Horne, 30
Christopher Hitchens, 
The Trial of Henry Kissinger
, (New York: Twelve Publishing, 2012).
Hitchens’ is perhaps the most vehement accusation of Kissinger’s career. Though he focuses on Kissinger’s
involvement with the bombing of Cambodia, his criticisms of Kissinger extend into the rest of his work.
17
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2007), 152.
Mearsheimer and Walt would also be highly critical of both Kissinger and the United States’ relationships with
Israel.
16

Isaacson, 188
.

18
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Kissinger's tantrums no one besides a few select individuals were out of reach of his wrath in
the office.19 While Kissinger's harsh management style may have engender loyalty in the inner
circle of his staff that remained with him throughout the years, this was a serendipitous
consequence and not a justification for his behaviour. These aspects of Kissinger's personality
would come to define Kissinger's leadership style as he ascended the steps of national politics.
Isaacson tries to chart a more objective path in his analysis of Kissinger and his lack of
personal interaction with Kissinger highlights this. The hallmark aspect of Horne's book had
been his reliance of anecdotes from his personal interactions with Kissinger to bolster his
credibility. This does create an interesting divergence between opinions on the value of
Kissinger's contributions to his own story. It is not only the prolific nature of Kissinger's writing
that creates such a tension. It is the fact that it has become very much the cornerstone for modern
foreign policy history.
The understanding of how Kissinger has impacted the Kissinger narrative (specifically
through his memoirs) begins by comparing the way Kissinger is written about prior and
following the publication of the various volumes of his memoirs. Some works like Bruce
Mazlish's Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy come from before the publication
of a volume of Kissinger's memoirs that would cover the same material.20 The fact that Mazlish's
book was published in 1976, just three years after the events of the Yom Kippur War, is
significant in that it gives a look at perceptions of Kissinger just following the end of the war.
Even at the time of Mazlish's book, the perception already existed of the dynamic
between Kissinger and President Nixon. Not only that, but it was evident how both of their

Isaacson, 193
.
Bruce Mazlish, 
Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy
, (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 250.

19
20
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personalities played into the tension between the positive and negative aspects of their
relationship. Overall, Mazlish describes this tension as one that had to be overcome, rather than
one that benefitted both men.21 Kissinger was viewed as the subordinate who eventually grew to
a point where it seemed as if he had surpassed his boss.22 While this will be important in context
of a discussion on Kissinger in relation to Nixon, it is also important to understand how
Kissinger's career success in general was perceived.
Many of Kissinger's professional successes in the diplomatic arena occurred at the same
time as President Nixon's personal and professional reputation was floundering in light of
Watergate. The only successes that the Nixon White House could count were in the arena of
foreign relations. And those efforts were being spearheaded by National Security Advisor (and
later Secretary of State) Kissinger. Such similarities with the current Kissinger narrative could be
interpreted in two ways: On one hand some argue that Kissinger then ultimately did not have
much control over his narrative. But the alternative becomes more plausible; that it was not only
Kissinger's writing (memoirs) that had such an impact. His own time in office found him highly
influential on how the media and the public not only viewed foreign policy, but how they viewed
him as well.
However, more recent examinations of the relationship between Henry Kissinger and
President Nixon have shined a light on the more positive aspects of their interactions. Robert
Dallek's double biography with its telling title, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power
,
acknowledges the tumultuous relationship between the two men. But Dallek goes on to point out
how Nixon and Kissinger's similar professional ambitions and common personality traits were

21

Mazlish, 245.
Mazlish, 250
.

22
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ultimately the commonalities that trumped their differences and allowed them to successfully
work in tandem during their careers. Not only that, but their common trajectories would find
them continuing to share the same focuses after their departure from their government positions.
23

Dallek lists both men's laser focus on foreign policy24 and their isolating personalities25 as two

of the reasons why they were able to work together as well as they did.
What distinguished both Nixon and Kissinger in terms of foreign policy was their
adherence to developing a big idea or doctrine about foreign policy. G. Warren Nutter elaborates
upon Dallek's point in his book aptly titled Kissinger's Grand Design which deal exclusively
with Kissinger's foreign policy doctrines centering around dètente26. Nutter emphasizes that
dètente wasn't simply an exercise in passivity. Dètente was an umbrella policy in the sense that
while it emphasized peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
European and Mediterranean theaters, it was achieved by developing strong deterrents (such as a
strong nuclear missile program and nuclear warfare plan.) However, Nutter also emphasizes that
Kissinger believed this approach only worked when speaking of what Kissinger dubbed
“legitimate orders.”27 Only stable national governments who had a vested interest in international
affairs could function within this paradigm. Nixon shared this pragmatic approach in that he saw
peace achieved through a show of power to which governments could respond.
The irony of both Nixon and Kissinger's view of foreign policy was their adherence to a
doctrine on foreign policy was rooted in idealism in the sense that it assumed that all manner of
international relations issues could be responded to in a similar manner. However, the

Robert Dallek, 
Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power
, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
Dallek, 135.
25
Dallek, 534.
26
G. Warren Nutter, 
Kissinger’s Grand Design, (
AEI Press, 1987), 15.
27
Nutter, 2.
23
24
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pragmatism of their actual implementation of any such doctrine lacked any such ideal notions
such as fairness or morality. Though Alistair Horne argues that this lack of moral value reaches
back to the Enlightenment or even to Roman politics.28 Such an approach raised up national
interests as the greatest value of any decision and it looked after the national interest only
through a display or use of power. Dallek points this foreign policy mentality that Nutter
elaborates and explains it as the factor that brought Nixon and Kissinger closer together but
which distanced them from their colleagues and from the public.29 While Nixon and Kissinger's
personal lives were markedly separated from their professional lives, these character aspects
would affect how they interacted with others in both spheres.
Seymour M. Hersh in 
The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House provides
a more negative view of the relationship between Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.30 On one
hand, Henry Kissinger was a constant thorn in the side of the Nixon White House as he
constantly was working to expand the influence of his office. On the other hand, Hersh argues
that Kissinger and Nixon were complicit in questionable policies regarding foreign policy. He
points to the two working to extend the conflict in Vietnam indirectly by continuing to bomb
Cambodia even though this campaign had produced few positive results.31 He also points to how
both ignored both Sadat’s peace proposals and threats towards Israel leading up to the war in
1973 as key factors for why the Yom Kippur War took place.32

28

Horne, 402.
Dallek, 245.
30
Seymour M. Hersh, 
The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House
, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1983).
31
Hersh, 54.
32
Hersh, 220.
29
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Walter Isaacson also noted how Nixon and Kissinger's different way of handling foreign
policy put them at odds with those around them. However, instead of emphasizing the reliance
on brute power or the threat of force as the cornerstone of their foreign policy, Isaacson claims
that Kissinger and Nixon's use of intrigue and backroom deals was the true hallmark of their
unique style of diplomacy.33 Isaacson writes that it was in spite of all of their differences that
Nixon and Kissinger were able to work together. For him, three common traits of Nixon and
Kissinger are evident. They were both highly suspicious and very secretive. They assumed the
worst of others' motives. They pitted their enemies against one another in order to gain an upper
hand.34 No matter which character traits brought Kissinger and Nixon closer and allowed them to
work together, the consensus seems to be that it was their character flaws and not their strengths
that were similar.
Much, if not most, of Henry Kissinger's career is judged based upon his success in
foreign policy. He had little to no concern for domestic policy or politics as even his time
teaching at Harvard was spent teaching and advising on international affairs.35 For some
th
scholars, Kissinger defined foreign policy for much of the latter half of the 20
Century what

Kissinger believed of foreign policy would become US foreign policy. George D. Cleva devotes
his whole book to the relationship between Kissinger and US foreign policy.36 For Cleva,
Kissinger brought a very different paradigm to counterpoint US foreign policy up to that point.

33

Isaacson, 130.
Isaacson, 139.

34

Isaacson, 74
.
Gregory D. Cleva, 
Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy, 
(Philadelphia: Bucknell
University Press, 1989).

35
36
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He focuses on Kissinger's writing on the distinction between what he labels the “island nation”
and the “continental nation.”37
For Kissinger the model of an island nation (an example from at that time would be Great
Britain) was counterintuitive to America's goals of global influence and prestige. This notion of
the United States as an island hearkened back to American isolationism preceding both World
Wars. The notion was that if the United States did not become involved in foreign conflicts, the
consequences of those conflicts would not be felt at home. Kissinger suggests that certain strains
of political thought had influenced the US to try to remain within this island nation paradigm
when indeed the US should be branching out to maintain its influence.38 The United States could
best serve its own interests by taking an active part in regional and international affairs.
Kissinger was in turn heavily influenced by the experiences of Prince Klemens von Metternich
and British Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh. He lays out a new paradigm for US policy,
Realpolitk, which he articulates in his doctoral thesis. Realpolitik is a more pragmatic, power
centric focus where foreign policy is based on objectives of power and influence instead of
ideological or perceived moral foundations.39 Even as early as 1976, these influences were
perceived by those that followed Kissinger.40
Realpolitik would become the hallmark of Kissinger's foreign policy legacy as it
dramatically changed the way the United States dealt with international issues which was of
particular concern as the United States was still embroiled in the Vietnam War. No longer would
such conflict be waged purely in the name of ideology (combating Communism). Instead, any
Cleva, 48
.

37

Cleva, 13
.

38

Isaacson, 655
.

39

Cleva, 12
.

40
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action by the United States should be governed purely by national interests. During the Yom
Kippur War this meant ignoring Israel's immediate concern of military and national survival.
Instead, by keeping the United States from wading into the conflict for just a while longer,
Kissinger hoped to pull other Middle Eastern nations under the United State's umbrella of
influence. Nixon's own doctrine for foreign policy was crafted by Kissinger.41 This power centric
focus to foreign policy would mirror the moral ambiguity that Kissinger brought to his political
dealings in Washington.
The second defining aspect of foreign policy brought forth by Kissinger was dètente.
Dètente was in effect a state of stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union
centering around their interactions in Europe and the Mediterranean.42 It was in effect a
relationship of nonaggression; even more than that it was the closest thing to mutual agreement
on movements towards peace that had existed since the beginning of the Cold War.43 Dètente
was seen and continues to be viewed as one of the greatest shifts in the relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union.44
This cooling off of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was just
beginning to take effect in 1973 would weigh heavily upon Kissinger's (and to some extent upon
Nixon's) mind at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. In Kissinger's mind, the war was a
nowin for all the players involved. Not only would it cause more regional turmoil, it would also
draw in the superpowers and threaten to spread into a great conflict if left untended.4546 In

Dallek, 181
.

41

Horne, 344
.

42

Horne, 25
.

43

Horne 153
.

44

Horne, 263
.

45
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hindsight, dètente would be blamed in part for tying the hands of the superpowers from taking
any effective action to stop the outbreak of hostilities between Egypt, Israel and Syria.47
The United States and Kissinger feared growing Soviet influence with the Arab countries
like Egypt and Syria. However, in the years and months leading up to the Yom Kippur War, this
perceived Soviet influence would be tested. Sadat tried to both open diplomatic channels with
the United States and to obscure any military plans from international oversight. To accomplish
both, he removed Soviet military advisors from the country in 1972 and in 1973 continued to
eject other Soviet officials.
For the Soviet Union, this created instability in the region and especially with the
countries that would be involved in the war. While the Soviet Union still had strong ties with
Syria, its weakened ties with Egypt gave it uneven influence with the two principle Arab
countries involved in the conflict. Thus, when Kissinger asked Soviet diplomats to attempt to
restrain Egyptian or Syrian offensives leading up to the war, the Soviet Union was hard pressed
to deliver, even if it wanted to, because it did not have the control in the region that it had had
previously. However, at the same time the United States still perceived that the Soviet Union did
have this influence. So when the Soviet Union was not able to restrain its client states, it put a
diplomatic and political pressure on the Soviet Union’s relationship with the United States.

46

Galia Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War,” Israel Affairs 6 no. 1 (Autumn 1999): 127, Academic
Search Premier.
Isaacson, 537
.

47
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Context
The comparative lack of foreign conflicts that the United States faced during much of
1973 only highlighted the turmoil taking place within the country during that year. The greatest
domestic tension facing the United States and the Nixon administration was the Watergate
Scandal48. Throughout the year, President Richard Nixon continued to try to control the fallout,
both legally and in public opinion. However, a growing number of members of the Nixon
administration were implicated in the scandal.
As the year went on, a greater amount of President Nixon’s time and attention was
focused on this growing domestic and personal crisis, while external events and conflicts
continued to be ignored. At the same time a portion of Nixon’s staff and a growing number of
federal departments were consumed by Watergate49 , thus immobilizing the executive branch (and
other groups like the Justice Department) in terms of other domestic issues and especially
regarding foreign policy. This vacuum was increasingly filled by the Defense Department, the
Pentagon, but especially the State Department (with a newly installed Secretary, Henry Kissinger
50

.)
Since 1969, Henry Kissinger had held the post of National Security Advisor, working

within the Executive Branch on foreign policy issues closely related to general national security
(the reopening of communication with China is largely credited to him51 .) However, even as he
succeeded William Rogers as the new Secretary of State52, Kissinger held onto the position and

48

Kissinger, 72.
While Kissinger’s analysis of events documented in his memoirs may be suspect, a broad timeline of events is
reliable and can be verified with external historical sources.
49
Kissinger, 243
50
Kissinger, 423.
51
Kissinger, 63.
52
Kissinger, 420.
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power of National Security Advisor, effectively giving him a position and power within two
large areas of the federal government (both heavily influencing foreign policy.) While Nixon had
begun his second term with the same determination that he had had in his first term to directly
control all aspects of foreign policy53, Watergate would force him to rely more and more on
lieutenants like Kissinger to maintain the workload. Even as this was an unwanted abdication for
Nixon, it was very much unnoticed by him as well in the sense that it was not intentional. As
Nixon continued to curl in upon himself to escape public and legal scrutiny, subordinates with
agendas (like Kissinger) were only too happy to fill the vacuum.
Henry Kissinger had been active in government for many years, stemming back to his
time as a professor at Harvard. However, he had not been able to gain a position of significance
in the preceding Kennedy and Johnson presidential administrations54. The quick series of
promotions within the Nixon administration gave Kissinger the platform to test and carry out the
policies he had formulated as an academic. Notions such as 
realpolitik55 (a pragmatic approach
to diplomacy, compared to an idealistic or moralistic one, having the sole aim of advancing
national interests) were no longer the subjects of which to write books. Instead, 
realpolitik 
could
now be tested by Kissinger as he dealt with foreign states such as China or the Soviet Union.
With his dual posting as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, these policies could
be carried out, to some extent, both diplomatically and militarily. Initially, this would be done
under the auspices of Nixon himself. But as President Nixon’s direct involvement in the West
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Wing dwindled, Kissinger would begin to make more and more unilateral decisions that would
drastically affect foreign policy56 .
Richard Nixon had not intended to bestow so much power and influence upon Kissinger.
In fact, like his predecessors Lyndon Johnson and especially John F. Kennedy, he began his
tenure trying to keep the meddling Kissinger out of any position that had too much influence.57
Kissinger was known for resisting authority that tried to curb his ambition. In fact, Nixon had
hoped to run an administration that could point to many foreign policy accomplishments. While
this was important to Nixon professionally, it was also deeply personal. His defeat to John F.
Kennedy in a previous presidential election had highlighted his comparative lackluster military
service and apparent foreign policy experience in light of the younger Kennedy who was not
only celebrated as a war hero, but also as the son of a United States Ambassador (His father, Joe,
served was the ambassador to the United Kingdom while the younger Kennedy was growing up.)
The reality was that the young President Kennedy came into office with just as much experience
as Nixon perceived in himself. However, lukewarm public opinion towards Nixon during the that
initial presidential campaign and then into his first term as president pushed him to seek out
greater public appeal. Watergate would sour those attempts during his second term. Sadly, if not
for Watergate, Nixon’s foreign policy accomplishments in Vietnam and China would have been
remembered as even greater than his predecessor Kennedy, to whom he continued to compare
himself.
The Paris Peace Accords that aimed to end the conflict in Vietnam were signed in
January58, thus easing tensions with Vietnam’s northern neighbor, China. This move worked to
56
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end a wildly unpopular conflict in Asia and showed Nixon as a pragmatic leader who preferred
to cut the United States’ losses in a conflict with an unclear objective.59 The reopening of
diplomatic relations with China had started the year earlier, culminating with President Nixon’s
personal visit to the country.60
Even as the United States’ relationship with one communist state began to defrost, the
US’s relationship with the Soviet Union also continued to thaw in what is known as a period of
dètente. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union
had begun to realize the calamitous power of the nuclear arsenals under their possession. The
deescalation following the crisis led to increased communication between the respective leaders
of the two states and a series of discussions and treaties between the two superpowers.. Most
notably among these were SALT I and II, as well as START I and II (the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties respectively.61)
Even as tensions were deescalating between the United States and the Soviet Union in
the fall of 1973, other tensions in the Middle East that had been simmering since the Six Day
War of 1967 would eventually reach a sudden boiling point. The Middle East had remained a
conflicted area since the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. Following the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the region had been in a state of perpetual conflict
erupting into a number of allout wars in the ensuing years. Most of the time in between the end
of the Six Days War in 1967 and the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was spent in a
perpetual military conflict known as the War of Attrition62 . Following defeat in the Six Days
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War, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Organization began a three year offensive
against Israel that included continuous artillery bombardment, airstrikes, and raids. This effort
was intended to weaken Israel and to compensate for the Arab states’ diminished reputation
following the Six Day War.
The War of Attrition faltered following the death of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel
Nasser and the ascension of Anwar Sadat to the presidency. This was in part due to the fact that
the War of Attrition had up to that point failed to produce any concrete successes for the Arab
states involved. It was also because as Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser, he sought to build a more
defined relationship with the United States while still grappling with Egypt’s historically strong
ties to the Soviet Union.63 The continuous conflict between Egypt and Israel strained the United
States’ ability to engage with Egypt while it struggled to reconcile its desire to exert influence
over Egypt with its close relationship with Israel.
The political dynamics in the Middle East shifted slowly but decidedly in the decade
before the Yom Kippur War. On an international level, the United States and the Soviet Union
slowly stopped using conflicts between the Arab countries and Israel as proxy conflicts to
advance their agendas in the region and on the international level. As the direct conflict between
the superpowers diminished, instability in the Middle East became undesirable as it could be the
spark that reignited large scale conflict that could eventually turn nuclear.64 Up to this point the
Arab countries, especially Egypt, were squarely under the influence of the Soviet Union who
supplied these countries with supplies, weapons, money and military advisors.65
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On the other side was the United States who had a historical connection to Israel as the
first state to recognize the State of Israel’s sovereignty in 1948.66 While evidence of the
American government’s actual support for Israel is not as abundant as what is perceived, the
American public’s attitude toward, and politicians’ connection with, Israel maintained a strong
bond between the two countries that was obvious inside the United States and to the international
community. The United States had been reluctant to supply too many arms to Israel out of fear of
alienating more moderate Arab countries like Saudi Arabia upon whom the United States relied
for oil.
While these series of tacit alliances had remained relatively constant since 1948, the
1970’s would be a time when the foundation under those relationships would begin to shift.
While public opinion continued to clamor for support of Israel, diplomatically, politically, and
militarily, Israel was often left disappointed by its patron. From voicing support for Israel in the
United Nations or the Security Council or in supplying the weapons needed to maintain its air
force and air superiority over its neighbors, the United States was not enthusiastic about
advertising its relationship with Israel and was reluctant in the help that it did provide.67
The same reluctance existed between the Soviet Union and Egypt. Egypt continued to
lobby for updated weapons (especially aircraft) that the Soviet Union was continuing to develop.
However, the Soviet Union saw that it was only due to their subpar weaponry that Egypt and its
allies had not launched any more offensives against Israel. Updated arms would encourage Egypt
to attack Israel and upset the delicate stability that the Soviet Union preferred in the region at that
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time. Both Israel and the Arab countries would sense this wavering support from their patron
superpowers. Israel would not abandon the United States for the Soviet Union, but it would
begin to leave American leaders out of the strategic and military decisions it was making. Egypt
on the other hand would be more vocal in its frustration with the Soviet Union after pleading for
more support, eventually leading to Sadat expelling Soviet military advisors on the eve of the
Yom Kippur War. In attempting to prevent an escalation of conflict in Middle East by
withholding support, both the United States and the Soviet Union unwittingly alienated the states
under their influence and created pressure in those Middle East countries to break the stalemate.
68

The close association between Egypt and Syria placed pressure on Israel from two fronts.
Egypt and Syria had been closely connected since 1958 when the two had been united as the
United Arab Republic.69 While they were no longer politically connected as a single state, they
would continue to collaborate even as both were closely associated with the Soviet Union. While
Egypt and Syria were purportedly equals in this relationship, Egypt’s vastly larger population
and superior military made it the dominating partner in this arrangement. This would become
even more evident in the aftermath of the 1973 war in which Egyptian president Sadat left Syrian
President Hafaz alAssad in the dark about Egypt’s offensive plan of which Sadat expected the
Syrian military to be a key player.
On the other side was the State of Israel with its prime minister Golda Meir. Meir was
born in the Ukraine but moved to Wisconsin as a child. She had immigrated to Israel even before
its establishment as a sovereign nation. She had been involved in the Israeli government during
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the war of 1948 and during the Six Days War in 1967. Having witnessed these previous
conflicts, Meir was alarmed by the suspicious activity leading up to the Arab offensive in
October of 1973. However, she, like many in the Israeli government, was hesitant for Israel to
appear in any way to be the aggressor in a military conflict. Tension had already been building
between Israel and its European allies who had been instrumental in supplying Israel with up to
date weaponry that had provided a clear edge over the surrounding Arab militaries.
Israel had been used to being forced into a position of making unilateral decisions
without consulting with its allies and benefactors. On occasion the imminent threat of
annihilation forced Israeli leaders to quickly make political and military decisions that would
cause international tension. The Six Days War was a prime example of this. After receiving
intelligence that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were preparing to amass their armies to attack, Israel
launched a preemptive strike. While this war would prove successful for Israel as it took over the
Sinai peninsula, the West Bank, Golan Heights, and other territory (including the city of
Jerusalem,70) there were a number of unintended consequences of this war that would have an
effect up until 1973 and beyond.
The crushing defeat of Arab armies by Israel would engender a sense of inferiority in the
command structures of those militaries. Arab leaders would continue to look for ways to prove
their armies equal to that of the Jewish State, thus heightening the instability caused by a
potential conflict always on the horizon. The defeat of the Arab states also affected benefactor
states like the Soviet Union who saw the downfall of a strategic partner as a reflection on its
standing in the bigger picture of the Cold War.
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Even as their military standing continued to be in question, the Arab countries also were
gaining influence and leverage through oil exports. Though Egypt and Syria were not major oil
exporters in the region, they could count on the support of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq
when it came to a conflict with Israel. This influential bloc would be able to use the threat (real
or implied) of an oil embargo to distance Israel from its allies. European countries like Great
Britain and France who supplied weapons to Israel (and didn’t have any major abilities to
produce their own oil) would back off from supporting Israel in order to ensure their countries’
steady supply of oil.
The United States did not face as great of a dilemma in this regard. It had some oil
producing capabilities of its own. It had other oil suppliers that were not directly in conflict with
Israel. And its position as a global power allowed it to engage in more questionable political
choices in the eyes of the Arab states (who ultimately answered in large part to the Soviet
Union.) While the United States did not completely back off in its support of Israel, it spent most
of the 1960’s and 1970’s deciding if the partnership with Israel had produced any tangible profit,
politically, diplomatically, economically, or militarily. At the very least American presidents
began to exert pressure on Israel to not antagonize its hostile neighbors and refrain from
launching any military offensives.71 This was true at the end of September of 1973 and into that
October. However, it was not merely due to the influence of the United States that Israel failed to
look out for a fight from its Arab neighbors.
Even as Israeli intelligence and American assets were perceiving evidence of a potential
Egyptian and Syrian military buildup, Israeli leaders and their advisors were misinterpreting the
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information they were receiving. While Presidents Sadat and Assad were careful to have their
commanders obfuscate the movements of their militaries, there were unavoidable signs of
mobilization leading up to the beginning of October, 1973. Though this information was being
gathered by Israeli intelligence agencies72, the leaders of Mossad (the Israeli clandestine service)
and Aman (security intelligence) brushed off this information (as did many army and air force
commanders) and recommended that Prime Minister Meir refrain from mobilizing Israeli forces
for fear of provoking Egypt and Syria. Golda Meir followed this assessment and neither
mobilized troop nor launched a preemptive strike.
The United States was seeing much of the same intelligence that Israel was receiving.73
Though tensions in the Middle East were not a high priority in the latter part of 1973, Secretary
of State Kissinger was still in communication with many of the key players in the future conflict
when it came to other issues and policies he was pursuing. He too urged Meir not to provoke the
Arabs and secured assurances that she would not launch an early offensive.74 Reigning in Israel
was a concern not just of Kissinger, but also of Nixon and the administration. Just as both
countries were receiving the same intelligence, they also were both fairly resolute in wanting
Israel to remain the nonaggressor. However, the United States’ reasons for this were vastly
different than Israel’s. In fact, Kissinger’s motivations and policies would differ from those of
Nixon. This would become evidence at the start of the war. As Nixon was indisposed to deal
with the conflict in his own way, Kissinger had the latitude to carry out foreign policy as he saw
fit.
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The attack initiated by Egypt and Israel on October 6, 1973 took place along the Suez
Canal and the Golan Heights. The Egyptian army crossed the canal and overtook the Israeli Bar
Lev Line75 which was a series of defensive forts along the canal. In the three years following the
War of Attrition (19701973) the number of Israeli units along this line had been scaled down
with only a few units holding the forts themselves and a handful of tank groups set up a couple
miles behind this line to quickly respond to any single incursion along the canal.76 A multifront
attack along the canal overwhelmed these forces, pushing them back as reserves were hastily
called up. Not only was the Egyptian ground force far more numerous than the Israeli force, a
supply of Soviet missiles protected the tanks and infantry from the Israeli air force.77
On the northern front, Syria invaded along the Golan Heights it previously had controlled
before the Six Day War. Again, the Israeli air force was thwarted by Syrian missiles supplied by
the Soviet Union.78 As Egyptian and Syrian armies entered Israeli territory, Israeli reserves were
hastily called up. Throughout this entire military conflict, a different series of events were taking
place in telephone conversations between leaders and diplomats of various countries, trying to
prevent this fighting and then trying to stop the fighting.

Methodology
The Nixon White House recordings, and more specifically the infamous Watergate
Tapes, have heightened the perception of Richard Nixon as perpetually paranoid. A number of
the tapes were subpoenaed and contained incriminating information about White House staff
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involvement in the Watergate Scandal that eventually implicated President Nixon himself.79 The
White House recording devices were shut off once their existence was divulged to the public
during the Watergate hearings, incidentally shortly before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.
Thus verbatim records of the Nixon administration exist for only a little more than two years of
his presidency.80
If a mere two years of recordings and transcripts could tag Richard Nixon with such a
reputation for paranoia, how infinitely greater must the paranoia of Henry Kissinger be whose
transcripts of calls and conversations stretch over the numerous decades that he was involved in
government service. Both Nixon and Kissinger ostensibly implemented such records as a way to
review important meetings and interactions with staff, other government officials, and foreign
notables. However, the other unspoken purpose of such records was to hold accountable each
man’s staff and subordinates, and in Kissinger’s case his superiors which included Nixon
himself, accountable.
Many governmental officials have kept detailed records of their interactions to some
degree or another. However, the methods of both Nixon and Kissinger differed greatly from
others who had been in their position. The taping systems installed in the Nixon White House
were voice activated and recorded all verbal communication, whether the participants were
aware of it or not. On Kissinger’s end, certainly no other National Security Advisor or Secretary
of State possessed such a detailed record of his tenure in those positions. Whatever these records
may reflect about the personalities of the two men, and Kissinger and particular, they are an
historical treasury of information Henry Kissinger’s decisions and interactions.
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Henry Kissinger’s records fall mainly into two categories: telephone transcripts and his
memoranda of conversations,81 though there are a sprinkling of other similar primary documents.
These have been divided into two separate archives by the National Security Archive project
through The George Washington University.82 However, physical copies of these records can be
compiled and ordered by date and time to draw an accurate timeline of Kissinger’s conversations
during the buildup to the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent conflict.
Though the Kissinger telephone transcripts and memcons began to be unclassified in
2006, the database in which they are held is still quite unfriendly for historical research. There is
no online chronological organization or simple subject search mechanisms to assist in wading
through the thousands of pages of documents in the two collections.83 This compilation of
relevant document and the chronological organization had to be completed by hand.
This process was further complicated by the reality that the collections are still being
updated to an extent. While few documents are actually being added to the collections, hundreds
of documents already within the collection still have important sections of conversations still
classified and censored. Each time another such section is declassified, a new version of that file
is added to the database, thus creating a mountain of duplicate (though slightly different)
documents that further discourage academic inquiry into such a convoluted collection of data.
This lack of a full collection of primary documents to assist in reanalyzing Yom Kippur is not
just limited to Henry Kissinger’s role. Uri BarJoseph describes the same problem occurring in
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Israeli history where access to primary sources has been constricted because of government
classification paired with a lack of organization in the documentation that has already been
available to the public.84
Even as the dearth of primary documentation (before declassification) discouraged many
retrospective inquiries into this aspect of the Yom Kippur War, this additional roadblock has also
slowed such study, though much of this information is now declassified. As with any such
historical incursion, this is tentative with the understanding that the amount of available
documentation is continually shifting.
This examination draws on the transcripts from October 6,1973, the outbreak of the Yom
Kippur War, to the couple of weeks following the beginning of hostilities. Certain records from
the months before and after the start of the conflict can offer a solid foundation to understand the
context of the first few days of the conflict. However, a close reading of the activity in just those
first few days can elucidate the finer political and foreign policy intentions of Secretary
Kissinger.
Because of the unwieldy nature of the digital archive in which these documents are kept,
it was necessary to work with hard copies of the documents in order to more easily organize
them. First, the documents had to be downloaded en masse from the database (though this could
only be done document by document as the database had no way to extract documents on a
macro scale. Once these hundreds of pages of documents were in paper form, they were then
organized by date and time. A second pass through the papers involved marking relevant records
addressing the two questions of inquiry: Kissinger’s relationship to Nixon, including his level of
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influence in the White House, and Kissinger’s conversations with US and international leaders
that shed light on his agenda in the Middle East.
The sheer number of documents available to sort through in this investigation
necessitated a narrowed focus to the first two days, October 6 and 7, of the war. These two days
included Kissinger’s attempts to prevent a war, his conversations with international leaders to
respond to the outbreak of fighting, and his conversations with Nixon and his staff about the
President’s role in the conflict. The third and fourth days of the conflict are equally important,
but the third day saw Nixon entering the equation in force as he ordered Kissinger to send
supplies and equipment to Israel.
These parts build upon one another in the narrative of the war, but it would take a far
greater study to deal with the sheer about of information now available in declassified documents
to fully analyze the implications of all of those conversations. The first two days are important in
studying how Kissinger acted without being fully constrained by Nixon. Since Nixon did not
enter the equation until the third day of the war, these first two days show Kissinger’s political
and diplomatic agenda if left to carry on to its greatest extreme.

Kissinger’s Position and Influences as Secretary of State
Just as the collections of Kissinger files have been divided into two categories, this study
of Kissinger and the Yom Kippur is divided into two subjects of focus. First, Secretary Kissinger
played a heightened role in crafting the United States’ response to the military conflict in the
Middle East. President Nixon’s conspicuous absence at various points in the conflict elevated

Page 33

Kissinger into a position whereby he was the face of the government and spoke for the president
in ways that a Secretary of State normally would not.
Depending on one’s perspective, Kissinger could arguably be described as taking on the
additional roles of ambassador, intelligence chief, communications director, congressional
political liaison, and most importantly chief of staff. With this in mind, understanding
Kissinger’s role relative to his appointed position is important for noting the reach and impact of
his choices. This relationship with Nixon and with other officials can be traced through the
conversations Kissinger has with those subjects and with others about those individuals.
Second, the Secretary of State brought a shifted view of foreign policy than if President
Nixon had been directly involved in negotiations from the beginning. Thus, Kissinger’s views of,
and relationship with, Egypt, Israel, Syria, the Soviet Union and Europe would all steer the
United States in a certain direction. This period is arguably the point in which Henry Kissinger
attained the greatest influence and broadest portfolio of responsibility in government. Politically
and in regard to foreign policy, his policy of 
realpolitik could be tested to its extreme.85 Whether
realpolitik governed Kissinger’s decisions during this clash or not, Kissinger’s goals centered on
realpolitik 
and dètente had replaced Nixon’s goals. With Kissinger’s conversations records now
ordered chronologically, it is easier to trace the movement of Kissinger’s conversations and his
thinking as the conflict wore on while also aligning it to what was occurring in the Middle East
and within the rest of the government of the United States.
Conversations about a possible Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel began circulating in
the months before the Yom Kippur War actually occurred. Members of the Israeli intelligence
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community were the first to notice signs of an impending conflict,86 but even members of the
United States government heard of this possibility before the region blew up in October.87 In his
role of National Security Advisor, Kissinger knew about such a report, but no records show any
discussion of this in the West Wing with President Nixon. However, it should be noted the report
predicted that such an attack would take place within a few weeks of the report’s publication.
This was based off of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s feints where he would put the military
on alert and run exercises but would then recall those activated units. This would continue
throughout the months leading up to Yom Kippur. Therefore, it would be understandable for
Israel (and the United States,) to suspect that any buildup of Egyptian forces was an undisputable
sign of an impending Egypt or Syrian attack. However, this does nothing to explain any lack of
reaction once an attack was already underway, which is what happened on Yom Kippur.
Early in the morning of October 6, 1973, Secretary Kissinger made a phone call to Soviet
Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger informed Dobrynin that he
believed that a conflict between Israel, Egypt and Syria was imminent. (Either Egypt and Syria
or Israel would launch an attack)88 He also inquired if the Soviet Union knew anything about
this. Dobrynin deflects these questions and no resolution is reached, but Kissinger lets him know
that the United States is doing everything to restrain Israel and is also in contact with Egypt and
Syria to prevent any conflict. He asks Dobrynin for the Soviet Union to do the same. At the end
of the conversation he also included a message from President Nixon that both powers have the
responsibility to restrain the respective countries under their influence.
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The interesting thing about this final part of the conversation is that this request from
Nixon is not actually from Nixon as there had been no discussion between Nixon and Kissinger
about a possible conflict in the day or days before the beginning of the conflict and the
conversation with Dobrynin.89 It would not be until approximately two hours later that Kissinger
would notify Nixon’s staff about what was happening along the Israeli borders.90 Even though
President Nixon’s staff received the delayed report at this time, there is no evidence of when this
information was communicated to Nixon himself as it is some time later that Nixon gets on the
phone to consult with Kissinger about the situation.91 This conversation lacks substance as Nixon
simply asks questions to which Kissinger repeats the information that he has already given to
Nixon staff. There is no clear order given by Nixon to Kissinger about the posture the United
States should take in responding to the conflict, nor any instructions to Kissinger about what he
should do in his role as chief diplomat.
Henry Kissinger calls again to update the chief of staff Alexander Haig exactly two hours
after his first call of the day to him.92 Haig informs Kissinger that the president is sitting with
him so Kissinger gives both of them a review of what has happened. Again, this conversation is
incredibly onesided with Haig only repeating what Kissinger is stating or stating his agreement
with Kissinger’s assessment. Though Nixon is apparently on the call as well, he provides no
guidance or orders at that time, besides a terse domestic analytical statement of the conflict.93
Even towards the end of the conversation when Haig is stating what the president is planning to
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do during the next day, Kissinger offers his own strongly worded opinion that the president
should not return to Washington D.C. as Nixon is considering. In light of Kissinger’s previous
conversation with Haig, both appear to be working to keep the president out of a highly visual
position in the Middle Eastern conflict. While Nixon does not provide any clear instruction to
Kissinger at this time, Nixon does express his wish that United States naval forces near to Israel
be prepared to engage or assist.
This most interesting aspect of this conversation is a single reply that Haig relays to
Kissinger from Nixon. Previous to this, Haig has expressed the president’s wish to return to the
White House to monitor the conflict. Kissinger then expresses his concern with that plan, and he
suggests that the president wait until at least the afternoon since a United Nations Security
Council meeting hasn’t even been called. General Alexander Haig then states that the president
agrees with this suggestion and that “[the president’s] problem is if it is an all out war for him to
be sitting down here in this climate would be very, very bad.” Who would it be bad for? Possibly
Nixon could be referring to his relationships internationally, preventing the appearance of the
United States not doing enough to protect the interests of its allies or preserve stability. However,
if it is true that Nixon was already distanced from foreign affairs and engrossed with the fallout
of Watergate, his more pressing concern would certainly be the domestic political climate and
public opinion.
Between these two calls between Kissinger and General Alexander Haig, there is a phone
call directly between Secretary Kissinger and President Nixon.94 But this conversation offers no
new information from Kissinger other than what he has already conveyed in multiple
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conversations before talking to the president. In fact, this conversation shows the president as
passive, asking on a smattering of questions about how Kissinger is handling the situation, only
at one time does he venture to make a halfhearted order.95 Ironically this order, to let the press
and foreign governments know that Kissinger had informed the president of the situation, was
already carried out previous to this. This is exactly what Kissinger had ordered Haig to do in
their previous conversation.96 The fact that Nixon has Kissinger do something that Kissinger has
already done without Nixon knowing shows just how much Nixon has been distanced from the
operations of the State Department and his own staff.
All information being conveyed to Nixon from Kissinger is being funneled through chief
of staff Haig. The third call between Kissinger and Haig on October 6 is at 4:15pm.
Unfortunately, this is one of their first conversations that has a large section that is still classified,
but if the surrounding conversations Kissinger has had are any indicator, this is further analysis
of the progress of trying to work with the Soviet Union and Great Britain to convene a United
Nations Security Council meeting to beginning a ceasefire between Israel, Egypt and Syria.
Kissinger tells Haig to let Nixon know that the Soviet Union still have not replied regarding this.
97

Kissinger again invokes Nixon as the impetus for him returning to the State Department in

Washington to continue to oversee the conflict.98 This sort of invocation of the president is not
uncommon in situations in which it is not necessary for the president to be fully briefed on the
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situation but where everyone is in accord on the United States’ position on an issue (or at least
the White House is united in a decision.) The sequestration of a President during an international
conflict such as this is only logical if the president’s subordinates feel strongly that his
involvement will hurt the situation drastically more than it would help. However, if the
constitutionally mandated leader of the country is being kept of such decisions that have great
political, diplomatic, and legal consequences, it comes close to being a quiet and temporary coup
d’etat, that is if the executive had no knowledge or part in keeping himself out of the process of
making these decisions which could prove to benefit Nixon as he would have plausible
deniability and also a more popular figure (Kissinger’s) as the face of the United States’
response.
Kissinger continues this practice of dictating Nixon’s perceived involvement to the press
throughout October 6 and in the days following in conversation with chief of staff Alexander
Haig.99 If the chief of staff’s office up until this point had not functioned as a cabinet level
position, this is the point where the chief of staff’s office begins to rise in importance. Today the
position is seen as one of the most powerful in the world.
Secretary Kissinger finally receives some forceful direction from President Nixon around
7:10pm on October 6. Though this directive still is relayed through Haig, the president does
seem to have some goal for wanting to push a ceasefire resolution through the United Nations.
Thus concludes Kissinger’s interactions with Nixon (or more accurately with Nixon through his
chief of staff.)
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The next morning, October 7, begins again with another conversation between Kissinger
and the chief of staff. President Nixon is only mentioned by Haig when he tells Kissinger he is
“about to go to see the boss.”100 A detailed report is given by Kissinger to Haig about the state of
the conflict on the ground along the Israeli and Egyptian border, followed by a discussion about
how to handle interactions with the Soviet Union, and lastly a question about how to approach
the United States’ relationship with Israel but also its other national interests in the region. This
last part of the conversation will be important in the context of Kissinger’s agenda for the region.
But since this information does not reach Nixon in any noticeable way (Kissinger and Nixon’s
staff keep it from Nixon), it is irrelevant to understanding Kissinger’s position in relationship to
Nixon.
Shortly after this conversation, Kissinger speaks directly to the President, updating him
about the Soviet Union’s lack of communication stalling the ceasefire efforts in the United
Nations. This conversation has three important points that show Nixon’s reaction to the conflict
as it begins its second day. First, Nixon’s initial contributions to the conversation are weak at
best. He agrees that Kissinger must hold off on pushing a ceasefire resolution in the United
Nations Security Council for fear of having no support from the other members if the United
States moves too fast. He also agrees that relying on the Soviet Union (Brezhnev) to push a
balanced ceasefire resolution. If the Soviet Union did not do that, Kissinger predicted that one of
the Arab countries would put forth a simple ceasefire proposal that would not favor Israel, and
any ceasefire that clearly was not beneficial for one of the sides would simply create a stalemate
101
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The second important note is that the President states that “[Public relations] is terribly
important. Even if we don’t do anything… Let Scali (the White House Press Secretary) go out…
he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem.” This is the first evidence of President Nixon’s
foreign policy understanding which was noticeable lacking up to this point in the conflict.
Nixon’s lack of investment in foreign policy during the conflict was conspicuous in light of how
invested he had been in the China deal, reopening relations with Beijing. Finally, ending the
conversation, Nixon makes his first notable diplomatic observation and directive. He tells
Kissinger to “keep one step removed” (from a meeting of the four permanent representatives to
the UN Security Council. So that “we can use you for the power punch.” This conversation
shows the first clear signs of the Nixon who was known for his foreign policy experience and
focus. However, at the same time it makes the lack of these traits earlier on in the conflict even
more conspicuous.
This involvement by the President again quickly goes by the wayside as Kissinger has
five conversations in quick succession where he invokes Nixon as the power behind the actions
he is taking. But the details he describes were never discussed at length in the previously
reviewed conversations with the president.102103104105 Another important conversation takes place
between Kissinger and White House press secretary Ron Ziegler earlier in the day whereby
Kissinger again is very heavy handed in dictating the sequence of events surrounding the United
States’ response to the war, including that the President was kept more aware of the situation
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than he actually ways.106 Henry Kissinger has one final direct conversation with President Nixon
during October 7 at 10:30pm. This last conversation contains a single statement by Nixon that
perhaps sheds the most light on the impact of Watergate on how Nixon handled foreign policy
thereafter. Kissinger begins discussing the military condition on the ground in Israel. He admits
that the force of the Syrian and Egyptian attack surprised him, but he downplayed the direness of
Israel’s condition as he says they hadn’t committed their reserve forces yet. Nixon interjects that
“The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be great (sic) achievement. One of
the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think… really tough.”107
Watergate’s effect on the Nixon White House is really only seen up to this point in the
lack of Nixon’s presence in the conversations with world leaders before and during the outbreak
of the Yom Kippur War. However, at this point, the implications of success or failure in the
Middle East have a political value for Nixon and he weighs this possibility over the phone with
Kissinger. The section of conversation after this statement is still classified in two different
releases of this transcript. The exchange that directly follows that line could shed even more light
on Nixon’s thinking in the moment, but for now that remains elusive to historical analysis.
Even within only the first two days of the Yom Kippur War a clear pattern is drawn of
Nixon’s aloofness at the beginning of the conflict that may or may not have been orchestrated by
Kissinger, along with the assistance of others like the chief of staff and others. Once the
president does become directly involved, he begins as a passive character, reacting the updates
passed along by Kissinger, but providing no true direction as the chief executive ought to at this
point. His final statement on the evening of October 7 is focused on the domestic political
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ramifications of a successful end to fighting in the Middle East. Plagued by congressional
investigation into Watergate, such a success would provide an increased margin of public
support (or sympathy) that could keep Nixon’s beleaguered administration afloat.
For Kissinger, all of these signs would point to an absent chief executive. His call logs
show that Kissinger’s response to this was to direct all information and direction regarding the
conflict through his office in the State Department. Having just left his previous position as
national security advisor, to some extent it does seem logical that Kissinger was the individual
best able to direct the US response to the war. On the other hand, the sheer number of individuals
he was in contact with in the government and in foreign government (and the content of those
conversations) clearly show him expanding his range of influence beyond any range that would
logically be found in his portfolio as either national security advisor or secretary of state (or
both.)

The Consequences of Kissinger’s Decisions
With Kissinger in this elevated position of authority and influence, the consequences of
his choices grow greatly as he is the most influential American official to interact with all of the
players in the Middle East conflict. To understand the net value of Kissinger’s impact on the
outcome of the war as it affected the United States, one must analyze Kissinger’s agenda for the
region and then compare it to the actual outcome of Kissinger’s decisions.
This analysis also begins early in the morning of October 6 in the same call between
Kissinger and Soviet ambassador Dobrynin. The limited information available to Kissinger is
apparent as Kissinger prods Dobrynin to understand the Soviet Union’s involvement with Egypt
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and whether Dobrynin knows that Egypt and Syria (according to Israel) are preparing to attack
Israel. The potential loss for the United States (at least Kissinger’s mind) must be greater than
that of the Soviet Union, because Kissinger commits to communicating with both sides of the
imminent conflict, whereas Dobrynin plays ignorant and does not discuss what the Soviet Union
knows about Egypt’s plans, nor whether the Soviet Union is doing anything to prevent a conflict.
108

This could be because no clear directions have been passed down from the Kremlin, or it

could be because the Soviet Union feels that there is no clear proactive response that will
improve its position of influence with the Arabs. Thus, playing coy and refusing to get involved
is the preferred option.
Kissinger’s next phone conversation is with the Israeli Head of the Bureau of the Chief of
Staff Avner Shalev. He again confirms that Israel is expecting an attack by Egypt and Syria109
while again urging Israel to refrain from any decisions that would make it appear to Egypt or
Syria that Israel had any intention of attacking first. A conversation with a government official
on the other side, with either Egypt or Syria, does not take place until almost an hour later.
Kissinger intentionally only communicates with these countries through the Soviet Union for the
beginning of the conflict. This either illustrates Israel’s closer relationship with the United States
when it came to working for stability in the Middle East, Israel’s higher capacity to restrain itself
to prevent any unintentional signs of aggression directed at Egypt or Syria, or Kissinger
suspecting that Israel did have offensive intentions before Egypt and Syria attacked. A
combination of the first two is most likely.
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Henry Kissinger’s first communication with an Egyptian or Syria representative on the
morning of October 6 takes place at 7:35am with a call to Egyptian foreign minister Mohammed
Hassan ElZayyat. The Soviet Union has clearly not done anything on their side to signal that
they were communicating with their client states, Egypt and Syria, to prevent those countries
from starting a war with Israel. Kissinger takes it upon himself to act as the intermediary
between Israel and Egypt and pass along assurances from Israel to Egypt that Israel had no
intentions of attacking. However, he received no such assurances from Zayyat, only an assurance
that Zayyat would relay such messages to President Anwar Sadat. Shortly after this he again calls
Israeli General Shalev to confirm that this message has been passed both ways, from Israel to
Egypt and now back the other way.110
Throughout these initial exchanges with Israel, Egypt and the Soviet Union Kissinger’s
modus operandi has been geared towards containment and prevention. Possible conflict brings to
mind the fallout of the 1967 SixDay War and the subsequent War of Attrition, both of which
had strained the relationship between the Arab countries and Israel. Any forward momentum in
the region towards peace had to move away from the antagonistic bend.
Kissinger has another call, this time with Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban. This
conversation’s most important point is when Kissinger refers to a conversation the two had had
the night before about a potential conflict.111 This conversation merely adds to the other evidence
that neither Israel or the United States lacked evidence that Egypt and Syria were attacking soon.
This evidence went back for months112 , though a series of false alarms made Israel, and by
extension Kissinger, complacent to a new buildup of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israel’s
ctober 6, 1973 7:45am Teleconversation between Shalev and Sec. Kissinger.
O
October 6, 1973 8:25am Teleconversation between Eban and Kissinger.
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borders. Both of these are important as they point to the fact that both Israel and the United
States had the pertinent information to begin planning for any attack, and any lack or response
was thus based off of a willful choice to ignore certain strains of intelligence that had been
present for a long time before October 6.
At 8:29am Kissinger receives a call from Israeli General Shalev that Egypt and Syria
have launched their attack, and that the information came while the Israeli cabinet had been in
session. Kissinger’s response again is to urge restraint. But it is also notable that Kissinger does
not question Shalev that it was the Egyptians and Syrians that commenced hostilities. The
analysis that Kissinger gives to each country that he talks to about who started what shows his
agenda for each subject.113
Secretary Kissinger’s next call is to the United Nations Secretary General. As the conflict
wore on, intervention by the United Nations and the Security Council would be required. If the
United States and the Soviet Union could not prevent a war, it would be up to the collective
international community to broker a ceasefire. The Secretary General would have greater
influence once this diplomatic side of the conflict was addressed, so keeping him informed and
open to the United States’ perspective was important to Kissinger. While before Kissinger’s aim
was to restrain both sides to prevent a conflict, once the conflict had started Kissinger moves to
implementing swift ceasefire, though this offers greater challenges than preventing a conflict in
the first place would have. This act of preventing a conflict and then quickly ending a conflict is
entirely possible coming from a position of complete neutrality. However, implementing a
ceasefire creates the obstacle of having to consider who has the upper hand at the time the
For a while, Kissinger avoids discussing with Egyptian officials who should be blamed for commencing

hostilities. While both sides most assuredly operate under the knowledge that Egypt was the aggressor, it would not
help the relationship between the two countries to acknowledge that or push the implications of that.
113
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ceasefire is proposed and when it is actually administered. For instance, if a cease fire occurs
while Egypt was in control of a large swath of Israeli territory, Egypt would be in a stronger
position to keep that territory in any postwar negotiations. This could work vice versa as well if
Israel had the upper hand. Such an arrangement would not be agreeable to the loser which would
almost assuredly mean the loser would veto any such peace agreement wherein they lost a
significant amount of anything in the negotiations.
Kissinger’s begins the day by working to maintain this neutrality, but he must first
address the United State’s historically close ties to Israel, and the strategic partnership already
present between the two. While Egypt and Syria would have to lobby the United States simply to
side with their version of events in a UN debate over a ceasefire, Israel begins on another level
by lobbying the United States immediately for supplies like ammunition and aircraft. The
disconnect occurs in that while Kissinger treats Israel like an ally (even a reluctant one on the
part of the United States) it does not treat Egypt or Syria like an enemy. This distinction puts
pressure on the supply situation as there are greater consequences for supplying an ally with
weapons to inflict damage on a country of ambivalence than on a country that with whom the
United States already had a rocky, even antagonistic, relationship. Any assistance to Israel would
hurt a relationship with Egypt and Syria.
Later in the afternoon of October 6, Kissinger has a conversation with the British
Ambassador to the United States, Lord Earl of Cromer, and outlines what he has done to address
the conflict. Great Britain would be an important player in working out a ceasefire as it was a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a heavily influential member of
the European community as much of the Middle East had once been a part of Great Britain’s
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protectorate. It is in the conversation where it is possible to see the outcome of how Kissinger
handles the tension in working with the two sides fighting in the war. According to this
conversation, Kissinger not only has to ask Israel as an ally and friend not to launch a preemptive
strike on Egypt or Syria, he also threatens steep consequences in the relationship between the
United States and Israel.114 On one hand the relationship is strong enough between the United
States and Israel that Israel does not immediately break off contact after what is objectively a
very rude and arrogant threat to make to an ally. But at the same time it illustrates how the
United States was consistently frustrated by Israel’s unilateral decisions.
This boldness in dictating to Israel the US’s expectations of its ally in preventing a
conflict also perhaps stems from Kissinger’s extreme confidence that Israel could successfully
respond to any offensive made by any or all of Israel’s Arab neighbors. Kissinger conveys to US
Senator Mansfield in a summary of events that he expects an imminent Israeli counterattack that
will result in Israel retaking its territory and even counterinvading into Egypt and Syria.115 If
Kissinger believed so much that Israel would prevail, the benefit of appearing sympathetic to the
Arab countries would vastly outweigh the cost of antagonizing Israel.
While Kissinger was not afraid to put pressure on Israel to prevent a conflict. He did fear
angering them in arranging a ceasefire, because the details of a ceasefire could possibly be
detrimental for Israel and it could lose territory.116 In the same conversation, Kissinger and Haig
talk about the implications of sending supplies to Israel and that there would most likely come a
time when the United States would have to in order to prevent an Arab victory. Even this early,
an Arab victory is an undesirable option for Kissinger who believed that it would mean that it
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would be impossible to work out any lasting peace. Even further than that, Kissinger claims that
a change based on that shift in regional dynamics would turn and appear to stem from the United
States’ own domestic issues– that the United States was too embroiled in its own internal
problems to secure a desirable resolution in the Middle East.117
Even with this very negative view of the potential of Egypt and Syria gaining the upper
hand, Kissinger tried to maintain communication with Egypt especially in an effort to treat it like
an equal in maintaining peace and preventing a conflict. Kissinger has a number of calls with
Egyptian foreign minister Mohammed Hassan El Zayyat in the morning of October 6. These
conversations are cordial even though they take place on the cusp of a war. In the first
conversation of the morning, Kissinger language is even handed in describing how the United
States would respond to an attack by either Egypt or Israel. Zayyat promises to relay Kissinger’s
message to the Egyptian government and Sadat. However, this message does not reach Sadat.
When Kissinger contacts Zayyat again at 8:15am, Zayyat states that he cannot give the
message to Sadat as the president is in the operation room. A strange claim from Zayyat that a
conflict has already begun that involves an Israeli naval incursion forces Kissinger to cease
pursuing his message of restraint and return to contact the Israelis to find out if there is any truth
to Zayyat’s claim that Israel had sent naval unites into the Gulf of Suez.
While the conversations between Kissinger and Egyptian officials remain cordial,
Kissinger becomes convinced throughout the day that Egypt and Syria did indeed initiate the
conflict118 and this affects how Kissinger responds to the conflict. In light of the fact that Egypt
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launched the attack and while at the same time believing that Israel will win the war, Kissinger’s
strategy to accommodate Egypt centers around protecting it from the consequence of losing after
attacking and specifically losing territory to Israel during any ceasefire negotiations.119 This
seems to be the best way to appease Egypt without leaning too heavily to the side of the Arab
countries thereby preventing any future long term peace agreements.
Kissinger also realizes that just as Egypt and Syria are now fully invested by launching
this attack, Israel too is in an untenable forward position in which it has to make a change and
move away from.120 This comes in another discussion about supplying Israel with much needed
weapons and aircraft. Earlier on, dialogue begins as such:
Haig: Interesting report. The Israelis are shocked by the confidence of the Arabs
Kissinger: Yeah, that’s right.
Haig: This might make easier negotiations.
Kissinger: Depends on how we conduct ourselves. We must be on their side now so that
they have something to lose afterwards. Therefore I think we have to give the
equipment…
The forethought to the response to Israel and Egypt indicates that Kissinger fully knew
the implications of not becoming involved in the conflict. However, after all of Kissinger’s
communication and negotiating, ultimately a consensus is tentatively reached on a UN resolution
for a ceasefire. Kissinger assured the Soviet Union that the ceasefire would take place at a time
when the Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian armies were back to their original positions before the
conflict. The kind of ceasefire for which he was advocating was one where both sides returned to
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their positions before the start of the war, thus negating any gains of either side and ending the
conflict where it began. Kissinger also worked to appease the European community, especially
Great Britain and France, that the ceasefire would not anger the Arab states to a point that the
Arabs would restrict the flow of oil to Europe and the United States. In light of Kissinger’s other
bold moves in influencing international affairs (his reopening of relations with Communist China
is the greatest example) this lack of forward movement seems to go against his usual practice.
For instance, with opening diplomatic relations with China, the backroom deals that Kissinger
brokered produced a landscapeshifting result. The United States connection to China would
limit Soviet influence in Asia. However, in this case, the status quo seemed to be the only
objective for Kissinger. In light of this, all of the influence and additional powers he had gained
as a result of Nixon’s virtual absence were apparently wasted. This would be true if this outcome
contradicted Kissinger’s overall agenda in foreign policy. This is where is policy of 
realpolitik is
especially important. If 
realpolitik
, valuing national interest over any other priority, including
ethical or moral ones, was the modus operandi for Kissinger, then his response to Yom Kippur
must be examined in light of this.
What was the United States’ interest in the context of the Middle East? Kissinger lays
this out clearly in two points in a meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen of China.121 Ultimately,
while the focus is on preventing Soviet influence in any region, the underlying goal is stability.
In light of dètente, the United States also had a thawing relationship with the Soviet Union. So
while Kissinger did not want to see an expansion of Soviet influence anywhere, this goal did not
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have to be carried out as antagonistically as it had in the past. Equity and balance between the
two superpowers was desired, even necessary for any ceasefire. This mean that there had to be
equity and balance between Israel, Egypt and Syria as the client states of the United States and
the Soviet Union. However, since both superpowers were working to serve their own interests by
protecting the interests of the client states (they thought) were under their influence, both used
different tactics in the United Nations and in communicating with their client states. In light of
how Kissinger handled the first few hours and days of the Yom Kippur War clearly show that
this balance mattered above anything. Kissinger was able to maintain that balance without fully
alienating Egypt, Syria, or Israel. Though the process to return to this balance would bring the
United States and the Soviet Union close to a full confrontation.

Conclusion

If Henry Kissinger’s major contribution to the Yom Kippur War was maintenance of the
status quo, what is the relevance and importance drawn through this reviewal of the primary
source timeline of the Yom Kippur War? On one hand, this can be a small step in rehabilitating
Kissinger’s reputation from simply being a master manipulator and dealmaker. The surprise
attack of Egypt and Syria did not allow for the usual backroom dealing in which Kissinger
engaged which relied on extended time to slowly push for his agenda. However, this also
solidifies Kissinger’s idea of 
realpolitik
as the governing principle of his career.
The expanded powers Kissinger was implicitly granted due to the power vacuum left by
Nixon would have allowed him to drastically alter United States foreign policy, especially
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towards Israel. Kissinger could have either unabashedly supported Israel with military supplies
and political support in the United Nations. He also could have turn his back on Israel and
showed a great deal more favor upon Egypt, beyond pushing for a ceasefire that saved the
Egyptian Third Army from being surrounded and destroyed by Israel. But neither of these
extremes fully suited the United States’ interests in the long run. Long term peace was the only
path that had any possibility of preventing the superpower that was the United States from
becoming entangled in a Middle East conflict where both sides were antagonistic towards the
US. In only two days, Kissinger had talked to the leaders of every major player in the Middle
East conflict. In these conversations he was able to lay the foundation of stability (after failing to
stop a war in the first place) that would only come to term once the United Nations Security
Council had helped negotiate a ceasefire. Though Kissinger’s intent was not to antagonize either
side in the conflict, the fallout of the Yom Kippur War on the United States showed that there
still was no way a superpower could win in the region. The Arab oil embargo that occurred
shortly afterward was in retaliation for the United States airlift of supplies and aircraft to Israel
before the ceasefire.
The United States’ policies would not only affect its relationship with Egypt, Syria and
the other Arab countries, they would also affect the balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the Middle East and around the globe. In stark and simplified terms, the Soviet
Union had a great deal of influence and sway over Egypt and Syria as its client states while the
United States was closely aligned with Israel. This is grossly simplified, but it is from this
dichotomous playing field that the nuances in the relationships amongst all of these states grow.
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The Soviet Union did not have the influence over Egypt that it did over Syria, and it did not have
the influence over both countries that the United States perceived it to have.
For the United States’ part, it did not unconditionally support Israel as the Soviet Union
and many European countries perceived. Its attempts to appease Egypt, Syria and the other Arab
states was intended to gain more allies in the Middle East besides Israel. This discrepancy
between perception and reality when it came to how each country perceived the influence of the
other would lead to miscommunication that would put the two superpowers on the brink of a
head to head confrontation that had the potential to turn nuclear. Such a conflict would move out
of a proxy war with both sides supplying and directing those countries under their influence to a
direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
These were the stakes facing Kissinger as he was influencing foreign policy for the
United States. Kissinger’s actions would first have an impact domestically. His continual
attempts to keep Nixon out of a position to make decisions for the first days of the war would
further distance Nixon from full executive power. It would also continue the practice of Nixon’s
subordinates withholding information from him and making decisions without his direct input. It
was breaks in the chain of command such as these which further weakened Nixon’s position and
led to his resignation as his political capital dried up.
On the international stage, Kissinger’s actions, intentional or not, pushed two
superpowers to the brink of war. While Kissinger remained popular at home (his approval rating
was one of the highest in the administration,) his decisions abroad would be scrutinized to almost
the same degree as other foreign leaders like Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The United
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States would eventually successfully broker a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, but this
would be after years and would lead to further angering of the other Arab states.
There was certainly only so far that Kissinger could push the US response without
Nixon’s support. The questionable authority he had in dictating the government’s reaction to
foreign nations and to domestic press would have ceased to exist if Nixon (or the press) had
understood the full length Kissinger’s unauthorized power had extended. Watergate was as
crippling for Kissinger as it was for Nixon in some ways. The level of public distrust not only
limited what guarantees he could make to foreign governments about the United States’
involvement in the conflict, but he also would have had to spend a significant amount of time
lobbying for support from the legislative branch to guard against negative public opinion. A
number of Congresspeople and Senators would introduce resolutions of support of the President
and the administration’s position in the Middle East.
The status quo may have been all that was required at the time of the Yom Kippur War.
Though the weeks of fighting produced no physical gains for either Egypt, Syria, or Israel, it did
shift something in the dynamics of the region so that less than 5 years later, the Camp David
Accords would become a reality. Egypt would be the first Arab country to make peace with
Israel. While there is no evidence that Henry Kissinger foresaw this exact endgame, his strategic
thinking may have at the very least kept in mind the possibility that doing little at present could
allow for a greater shift in the future.
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